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IN THE S.UPREME COURT
of the

STJ\TE OF UTAH
VERA T. CALLISTER,
Plaintiff and A ppellOJYI)t,
vs.

Civil No.
7967

ALFRED CYRIL CALLISTER,
Defenda.nt and Respjondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIE·F

This app·eal. is taken from .a judgment entered on
" December 31, 1952 modifying the interlocutory decree
of divorce theretofore and on July 30, 1945 entered herein. The interlocutory decree was base·d upon a contract
between the parties whereby Dr. Callister, the defendant,
agreed to pay to plaintiff, his then wife, $400.00 per
month during the life of plaintiff or until she remarries.
Mrs. Callister has not remarried. The judgment appealed
from reduces the amount .adjudged to plaintiff by the
interlocutory decree from $400.00 to $250.00 p·er month.
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STATEMEN·T OF' FACTS
The grounds of divorce are set 'forth in paragraph
3 of the F'indings of Fact ( Tr. 7, 8) by which it is found,
among other things, that the defendant has transferred
his affections from plaintiff to another woman, avowing
his love for the other woman and that his future happiness lies with her. The Doctor's affair of heart is fully
outlined in a letter dated March 21, 1945 addressed to
the plaintiff and introduced in evidence as Exhibit B.
Consistent with that portion of the Doctor's letter
to his wife that she need have no worry about financial
security and that one-half of everything belongs to her,
the agreement of July 28, 1945 attached to the Findings
of Fact in connection with the interlocutory decree ('Tr.
12-18) was entered into. Paragraph numbered "THIRD"
the-reof reads as follows:
"That the second party agrees to pay to first
party alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month
during the life of first party or until her re-Inarriage, and in addition thereto second party agrees
to pay to first party $50.00 per month for the
suppo-rt of the minor child; Vera Taft Callister,
until said minor child becomes 18 years of agr.
The alimony and support money payments herein
mentioned shall be paid to first party on or before
the 5th .day of each and every month beginning
August 5, 1945." (Tr. 15).
The inte:rlocutory decree, paragraph 5 (Tr. 21, 22)
awards plaintiff judgment against the defendant ufor
alimony" in the sum of $400.00 per month "during the
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life of plaintiff ·or until her reinaiTiag-e,'' thus foll<nving
the language of the agreement. The decree, 'vhile characterizing the judg1nent as alimony, doe~ not contain
the some,Yhat usual proYision Hor until the court otllerwise orders" nor does the judgn1ent terininate upon the
death of Dr. Callister. The decree expre8sly approves
the agreement of July 28, 1945 and orders the sa1ne to
be binding upon both parties. The agreement 1nakes
provision in favor of plaintiff for insurance carried on
the life of defendant and for present and prospective
attorneys' fees and costs. With regard to the latter
the agreement at paragraph numbered "S-EVENTH"
provides:
"~econd

party hereby agrees to pay all attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses in any manner
incurred by first party in the enforcement of this
contract, or by reason of any controversy arising
therefrom." (Tr. 16).
By the agreement certain corporate stocks listed in
Exhibit A attached thereto and of the then approximate
value of $96,000.00 (Tr. 62) were divided equally between
the parties and each received certain cash, . personal
property and real estate. Defendant received, among
other things, real p·roperty novvr known as the Callister
Hospital Clinic at 559 East South Temple., S·alt Lake
City, in which he subsequently invested $30,000.00' by
way of

cap~ital

improvements, and presently carried on

his books as a capital asset valued at $50,000.00 (Tr. 67).
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Shortly after the divorce Dr. c·allister purchased
a corner piece of property located at 23rd East and
39th South from his mother for $1,350.00 (Tr. 69), upon
which he has constructed a home for his present family
consisting of his new 'vife and one child at a cost of
another $30,000.00 ( Tr. 68). Since the divorce the defendant has sold stocks of the approximate value of
$19,500.00 ( Tr. 62, 116), retaining the securities listed
in Exhibit C (Tr. 63).

By reference to Exhibit E, the Pacific Coast Edition
of the Vvall Street Journal for November 25, 1952 and
received in evidence for the purpose of determining
the then market value of such of the securities that
are listed on Exhibit C as may be listed in the Journal
(Tr. 64), the securities so listed have a market value
of $50,512.50. By reference to Exhibit J, received in
evidence to determine the value of Utah Oil Refining
stock (Tr. 116, 117), the 33 shares of such stock held
by defendant have a value of app-roximately $990.00.
The 1,875 shares o:f Medical Arts stock held by the
Doctor have a value of ~1.10 per share (Tr. 64) or a
total of $2,062.50, and the Zions Benefit Building Society
stock of which the Doctor has 144.86 shares (Tr. 65)
valued at $50.00 per share (Tr. 102) amounts to $7,243.00.
In all the D·octor at the time of the hearing on his petition for modification had stock and securities of a value
of approximately $60,808.00, and real estate of the value
of at least $60,000.00 with a mortgage indebtedness on
the clinic property of $8,900.00 (Tr. 67).
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The defendant had a total gross income for the
year 1950 of $25,968.59 (Tr. 73), which did not include
dividends in the amount of some $3,250.00 (Tr. 70).
In 1950 the defendant had a total- income of some
$:2:2,700.00 from personal service in connection with his
profession and 'vhich did not include any income from
his hospital venture (Tr. 84, 85). In 1951 he had a
total income of some $40,400.00 which includes dividends
in the amount of $3,200.00 and income from the hospital
of $10,800.00, or an income from professional service~
in the amount of $26,400.00 (Tr. 85, 86). F·or the first
six ~onths of the. year 1952 the Doctor's gross collections were $14,8~0.00 (Tr. 91). In 1944 the Doctor had
a net income from his professional practice of $12,686.91
(Tr. 92). He persists in operating the hospital clinic
at a loss.
Plaintiff, after the interlocutory decree, sold some
$45,000.00 of her securities (Tro 12·2) and invested in
real property. She now o\vns the Nira Ap·artments in
Salt Lake City which she purchased for $55,000.00 and
on which she owes $21,340.00 payable at the rate of
$279.84 per month, and upon which she has made capital
improvements in the sum of $16,000.00. She has also
purchased a parking lot for $13,500.00 upon which .she
owes $8,432.62 (Tr. 124); a vacant lot on 21st East and
13th South for which she paid $6,800.00 (Tr. 125) and a
vacant lot on South State Street for which she paid
$5,250.00 which is being sold under a contract of sale
for $9,500.00 ( Tr. 124, 125). Werner Kiepe, called as a
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witness for Dr. Callister, testified that the Nira Apartments had a present market value of $75,000.00 (Tr. 78,
79); the parking lot $14,000.00 and the South 21st East
property $10,000.00 ( Tr. 79, 80). Mrs. Callister retains
five types of securi ties which she has held since the
divorce (Tr. 123). Computing the value of these securities by reference to the Exhibits E and F we find that
the present value of the same is $18,581.25. Mrs. Callister's net rental income for the year 1951, as shown
by Exhibit 2, was $4,255.85; for 1950, as shown by
Exhibit 1, the rental income was $4,568.45; the only
income shown by the record as going to Mrs. Callister
except for the so-called alimony payments.
The property settlement agre~ment recites the marriage of the parties on July 13, 191'6; that five children
have been born as the issue of the marriage, and Dr.
Callister testified that he is presently of the age of 58
years ( Tr. 54). The findings of the trial court on the
motion to modify (Tr. 151) are to the effect that the
Doctor's income from his practice has decreased from
$1000.00 to $600.00 per month; that heart trouble consistent with coronary artery disease, progressive in its
nature, requires the Do'ctor to abstain from activities
producing physical and mental strain, thereby reducing
his ability to earn income from his profession; that since
the original decree the Doctor has been required to sell
many of the stocks distributed to him in the property settlement fo-r the purpose of providing facilities and equipment for carrying on his practice and profession and
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providing a home for himself and family; that since
the entry of the interlocutory decree the Doctor has
remarried and has a child of the age of 4 years depending
upon him for support and maintenance.
After finding that the plaintiff, the appellant herein,
has a net rental income in excess of $4,500.00 per year
with income from interest and investments in stocks it
is concluded that the original decree should be amended
as aforesaid, and that each party should pay his or her
own costs in connection with the proceeding. The Court
specifically finds th·at the plaintiff has adequate income
from which to pay her own costs and attorneys' fees
in defending the attack made upon the decree and
• property settlement agreement.
STATEMEN·T OF POINT·S
This appeal challenges the findings of the trial court,
its conclusions of law an:d its decree of modifiea.tion,
each and every part thereof bemg contrary to the evidence and to law and in connection therewith we assert
the following:
1. The division of p-roperty, both p.resent and
prospective, was by contract confirmed by the interlocutory decree without consideration of the needs. of the
wife or the ability of the husband to continue to pay
and, therefore, not subject to modification.
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2. The so-ealled alimony provision is not subject
to modification but only to termination as in the property
settlement agreement expressly provided and "\vhich conditions have not occurred.
3. The Doct9r husband cannot indulge himself the
luxury of a costly home for his new family and a clinic,
which he persists in operating at a loss, and thus claim
impoverishment to the extent that he cannot respond
to his contractual commitment and the decree of the
court confirming the same .
4. No change of fin·ancial circumstance not voluntarily assumed by defendant is shown by the record
warranting a decrease in the monthly payment to the
plaintiff, nor is there any health consideration that
merits such change.
5. The present incom,e of the pl'aintiff is the nor1nal
consequence of prudent investment from capital assets
received by virtue of the interlocutory de-cree of divorce
and pToperty settlement agreement.
6. The plaintiff should be awarded attorneys' fees
and costs in the defense of defendant's motion.
The foregoing arise on the face of the record without
an:r conflict in the evidence. There is no burden upon
the appeltant to show that the findings of the trial court
are manifestly or clearly against the weight of the
evidence as there is no substantial or any conflict with
respect thereto.
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE MONTHLY PAYMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO
MODIFICATION.

The rule that 've are contending for here is set out
in the case of Dickey v. Dickey, 141 A. 387, 58 A.L-.R.
634 (Md.), which holds that if the allowance to the wife
in the decree is the result of a p~revious agreement
'between the spouses and does not fall within the accepted
definition of alimony, so that it would have been impossible for the chancellor to have allowed permanent
alimony as the decree provides, then, notwi'thstanding
tllat even the parties and the court called it "alimony,",
the allowance for the wife in the de;cree was not alimony
and a court of equity has no power to modify the. decree'
as in the case of an award of alimony. The c·ourt points
out that the agreement by the husbiand to p~ay the wife
a weekly sum of money until her death or remarriage
did not limit his payment to the joint lives of the
spouses, and hence was not what the court could have
decreed as alimony.
In the instant ease we have the same situation as
, in the Dickey case, that is, that the agreement provides
the wife with a periodic payment without reference to
whe1her or not the husband survive'd her and where
the monthly payment is referred to as "alimony." The
Court in Dickey v. Dickey, supra, rejeeted as surplusage
and as ill-advised the clause "or until the further order
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of this court," thus bringing the decree in conformity
with the agreement of the parties and giving to the
decree its true import and intended effect by recognizing
it as having been founded on contract. So, in the instant
case, the term "alimony" as us~d both in the contract
and interlocutory decree should not cause the Court
to lose sight of th·e. contract itself.
The Doctor and his wife had been married for 29
years. The divorce came at the threshhold of the Doctor's
career. By his letter, Exhibit B, he stated his intent to
assure the plaintiff financial security and freedom from
financial worry.

The property settlement agreement

ap'proved by the Court as being just, fair and reasona:ble effectively binds the defendant to the payment of
0400.00 per month during the life of plaintiff or until
her remarriage. The. parties by contract divided their
accumulated property and assets "of actual and contingent value" and has the effect of allocating to the
wife the· monthly payment aforesaid out of the estate
of the defendant irrespective of his futu!e earnings.
The monthly payment to the plaintiff was but a part of
a well conceived and carefully prepared contract to •
effectuate a just, fair and reasonable division o~ property. It was not contemplated by the parties that either
of them could change or modify the provisions thereof
nor did the interlocutory decree so provide. It is difficult
to conceive of a more comprehensive statement of pur-
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pose and intent. It is difficult to understand hoiW the
trial court could have been so unmindful of the integrity
of contract.
In North v. North, 100 S.W. 2d 582, 109 A.L.R.
1061 (Mo.), the lower court modified a divorce decree as
to the allowance made to the wife which the divorce
decree denominates "alin1ony." In the original deeree
a judgment was entere'd in favor of the wife against the
husband for the payment of alimony at the rate of
$500.00 per month so· long as she remains single and
unmarried. Some seven years after the decree the defendant filed a motion asking that the divorce· decree
be modified as to the amount of alimony on the alleged
ground that the changed financial condition of the defendant warranted such acti'on. After a hearing the
lower court sustained defendant's motion and reduced
the allowance made to plaintiff in the decree from $500.00
to $300.00 per month. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant
died pending the appeal and the cause was revived in
the 'name of the executrix of the defendant's estate.
The Missouri S·upreme Court reversed the order of
the trial court modifying the decree, holding (1) a
husband and wife in contemplation of a se·paration and
divorce may, by valid contract between them, settle and
adjust all p~roperty rights growing out of the marital
relation, including the wife's right of dower and claim
for alimony, support and maintenance; (2) postnuptial
contracts of separation are not unlawful, and such. contracts when lawfully made, are sufficient to bar alimony
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and dower; (3) the statute which authorizes the court
to modify an award of alimony does not authorize the
modification of legal contractual obligation whlch the
husband assumes and agrees to pay his wife; (4) the
parties had a lawful right to settle all their property
rights by contraet between themselves which they did
do; ( 5) the con tract is supported by a valid consideration; (6) the legal duty of the husband to support his
wife when she liv~d with him, and his duty to provide
support and maintenance for her in case of a separation
and divorce furnished a sufficient consideration for the
contract; (7) as an additional consideration for the contract of settlement the wife agreed to release her dower
right in the husband's property.
We point to the similarity of the contract in the
instant case with the. principles announced by the court
in the N ort:h case, even to the recital that the parties
are desirous of settling any and all differences and
claims with reference to division of property, alimony,
support money, attorneys' fees and court costs, and to
paragraph numbered "SIXTH" which reads as follows:
"This agreement and conveyance is mutually
intended to be, and the same is here'by expressly
made and intended by each of the parties hereto
as a mutual release, relinquish1nent and conveyance of all the right, title and interest that n1ay
now be or shall hereafter be, during the life.t~inl c
or at the death of either of the parties hereto,
acquired by the other by virtue of said marriage
that now subsists between the parties hereto
under the laws of the State of Utah, in and to
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all of the p·roperty, both personal and real, of the
other party, except to the extent of the moneys to
be paid by the second party to the first party as
alimony and support money; and it is the intention of the parties hereto to 1nutually rele'a:se and
waive all provisions of the laws of the S:tate of
Utah relating to husband and wife as to dower
or the interests of the wife in the .real property,
homestead rights, etc., and forever b.a'r each other
respectively from rights of succession or inheritance by reason of the rnarriage relation existing
between them." (Italics ours).
In North v. North the Dickey case was quoted from
at length and the court held the provision in the decree
awarding the wife $500.00 per month to continue so long
as she remains single and unmarried (the same as that
provided in the contract between the parties) justifies
the conclusions that the decree was an approval of the ·
contract, and not an award of alimony, be-cause the .
court had no authority to make an award of a.pmony
to continue so long as the wife remains single and unmarried but did have authority to approve a contract
between the parties containing that provision, and concluded:
"Our conclusio·n in the instant case is that
the allowance made to the wife in the decree was,
in effect, an app.roval of the contractual obligation of the husband to the wife, and not an
award of alimony, and for that reason is no:t
subject to modification. A modification of the
decree would amount to a modification of the
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contract itself, which is not subject to revocation
or modification ·except by consent of the parties
thereto."
The authorities cited above go to the marrow of contract law and treat as ill-advised and misleading those
decisions that say without explanation that an agreement
between husband and wife settling their p-rop·erty rights
is not binding on the courts in a divorce action. Where
such contracts are free from fraud, eollusion, or compulsion, and are. fair to the wife, the courts have no
right to disregard them.

In Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 44 P. 2d 540 (Cal.), the
court held-: (1) that the parties may contract with regard
to their properties and their respective interests therein;
and (2) though not binding in the first instance on the
court in which the divorce action is pending such contract may be approved and confirmed by the court and
if ap·propriately referred to and adopted in its decree,
such decree, as to matters covered by the agreement,
be.comes immune from subsequent modification. In
Puckett v. Puckett, 136 P. 2d 1 (-C'al.), the property
settlement agreement was approved by the court and
payments ordered by the decree to be paid pursuant to
the agreement, thus making the decree· irmnune from
modification except by the consent of the parties. The
court held that the periodic payments were not aliinony;
they were a part of a property settlement. The court
stated that the agreement there under consideration
leadls to the conclusion that the monthly payments
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ordered were an inseparable part of a property settlement agreement and therefore they may not be modified.
This 'vas on the theory that the monthly payments
ordered by the decree were in effect and essence, a phase
of the property settlement rather than mere alimony.
In Rich v. Rich, 112 P. 2d 780 (Cal.), the property
settlement agreement referred to monthly installments
as ''alimony." The decree likewise referred to the payments as "alimony." The payments were required bo:th
by the agreement and the decree to continue even though
plaintiff remarries. The plaintiff remarried after the
divorce and the appellant moved to modify the decree
by eliminating therefrom all payments accruing after
the remarriage of his former wife. The court below
denied the motion and on appeal the order was affirmed.
The Court stated:
"Appellant's contention cannot be sustained.
The payment of $2,400.00 to respondent was an
integral part of the property settlement agreement, and the fact that it was stated to: be
'alimony for her support and maintenance,' and
was to be paid in monthly installments instead
of in a lump sum, does not alter the fact that
the payments were made pursuant to the agreement ap~proved and adopted by the court in the
interlocutory decree, and not merely as alimony
awarded by the court. A careful reading of the
agreement indicates clearly that it was the intention of the parties to definitely, fully and permanently adjust all of their property rights, and
the title to the paragraph providing for the payment of the $2,400.00, 'Payment of Money t~
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First Party by Second Party,' clearly shows it
to be an integral part of the agreement. The
further clause that 'said (monthly) paYJ.nent.s to
continue· even in the event of remarriage' indicates also that it was the intention of the parties
that respondent should receive the full $2,400.00.
·To sustain appellant's contention would in our
opinion de:prj_ve respondent of what may well
have been an important part of the consideration
which induced her to execute the ag~eement. The
property settlement agreement having been approved by the court and incorporated in the
interlocutory decree, is now binding upon the
p-arties, and cannot now he avoided."
A recent expression from the California Court is
found in Tuttle v. Tuttle, 240 P. 2d 587. In that case
the situation was turned around. The wife attempted
to increase the amount specified in the decree for her
support and maintenance upon the ground of a change
of circumS'tances justifying an increase in the amounts
payable to her. The husband alleged that the provisions
of the decree for the payment of the stated amounts
was not an award of alimony but an integral part of a
property settlement agreement independent of the
divorce decree·. The decree was silent as to the property
settlement agreement. The Court, after a review of
previous California decisions, held: (1) the trial court
has jurisdiction to determine whether the decree was
based upon a property settlement agreement with payments provided as a phase of property adjustment and
therefore not subject to Inodification; and (2) there \Vas
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ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that
the provision for payments to the wife was a disposition
of property rights and not alimony.
So far as we are able to determine this Court has
not heretofore passed upon this precise question. In
Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010, there was no
contract involved and the divorced husband wa:s deceased. The Court held that minor children were entitled
to be supported out of the estate of the deeedent pursuant to the divorce decree providing for support. While
the question of following the claim for alimony into the
estate of the deceased husband was apparently not
before the Court, the Court, nevertheleS'~, stated:
"In such case, whether or not the divorced
wife and minor children, or any of them, are
entitled to have the payment of alimony or money
for their support continue after the death of the
deceased, depends upon the nature and terms of
the decree allowing same."
In Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 62.5, 148 P. 362, it was
eontended that the award of $40.00 per month as alimony
was fixed by the consent of the parties (apparently an
understanding). ~he Court held that every decree of
divorce and alimony must be deemed to have been
entered subject to the provisions of Section 1212, c·ompiled Laws, 1907 (Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953). This typ.e
of situation is analyzed and distinguished in the Dickey
v. Dickey and North v. North cases, supra. In Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P. 2d 792, the.
order denying a motion to modify the · decree was
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affirmed. The appellant contended that the trial court
was in error in ruling that a stipulation fixing alimony
payments was a complete and final settlement so as to
p-reclude the Court from modifying the order based on
such stipulation. The Court did not pass on the proposition as to whether there was an agreement for a complete settlement of all property rights, holding that the
agreement was just what it said it was, to-wit: a "stipulation" as to what the Court was willing to award her
as alimony and therefore that the trial court erred in
determining that the agreement constituted a complete
and final settlement between the parties, and on other
grounds held that the trial court properly denied the
motion to modify. The Court, however, recognized the
rule that we are contending for here by the following
statement:
'

'

"The general· rule in many jurisdictions is
that where the parties enter into an agreement
for a complete settlement of all property rights
in case a divorce is granted, which agreement is
approved by the court, neither party can thereafter come into court to have the agreement Inodified. For cases holding to this effect, as well as
contra, see annotations in 58 A.L.R. 639 and 109
A.L.R. 1068. However, the law with respect to
property settlements not being applicable to
situations where alimony is involved, we need not
enter into a discussion of the above ru1e, sin('c
we conclude that the 'stipulation' the substance
of which was incorporated by the court in its
decree, was not a property settleu1ent but an
agreement as to what ~alimony' the court 1night
award appellant in case a divorce \\!~as granted."
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In Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 2d 222, the
Court held that it could no longer be considered as an
open question in this State but that the Court has jurisdiction to modify the provisions of the alimony decree
which was originally based upon a stipulation of the
parties. We submit that in the instant ease a sole-mn
agreement of the parties adjusting between themselves
all of their property rights, including the rights of the
wife to so-called alimony, cannot later be repudiated by
either party as to payments denominated alimony or as
to any other feature of the contract, particularly when
the contract has received the ap·proval of the Court as
such. Again we point to the reasoning of the Dickey
and No-rth cases and to the provision that Mrs. c·allister
was to receive the monthly payment so long as she lives
or until she remarries, strengthened. perhaps by the:
provision for attorne-ys' fees and costs in favor of Mrs.
Callister and against the Doctor in any manner ineurre-d
"in the enforcement of this contract, or by reason of
any controversy arising therefrom," and also to the
express provision that it is the intention of the parties
"to mutually release and waive all provisions of the
laws of the State of Utah relating to husband and wife.
as to dower or the interests of the wife in the real
property, homestead rights, etc., and forever bar each
other respectively from rights of succession or inheritance by reason of the marriage relation existing between
them."
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There are certain tax implications involved in the
use of the term "alimony" but those implications and
the benefit that the Doctor derives from the payment of
the money as "alimony" should not preclude the c·ourt
to look upon the pre·sent contract as being subject to
change or modification except by the consent of the
parties. It is obvious from the contract itself that the
parties intended their rights to be contractual and not
the subject of modification. An added consideration for
the rights in favor of Mrs. C·aJ.lister was her immediate
relinquishment of dower interests and the rights of
inheritance.

II.
VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT IS NOT A GROUND
FOR MODIFICATION.

Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P. 2d 233, involved a situation where a husband, capable of earning
a steady wage sufficient according to the trial court to
entitle his wife to $250.00 a month alimony, gave up his
employment and entered into a business arrangement
whereby he received his keep and $1.00 a day as a fry
cook, with the hope of obtaining an interest in the business, if it proved successful. The Court held that by his
self-impoverishment the husband could not avoid his
responsibilit;r to his former wife.
In the Osmus ca.se the Court said:
"Nor does a 1nan have a right to sarrifice
the present needs and welfare of his fa1nily, and
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particularly of his infant children, to the end
that at some indefinite future time he may better
his own financial status. His first duty is to provide for those whom he is legally and morally
obligated to support, and if it becomes necessary
for him to forego business opportunities with
bright future prospects but with no present realization, in order to perform his obligations, the
la-,v-, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,
'vill require him so to do. From all the evidence
and all the fair inferences therefrom, the court
could reasonably find that defendant entered into
his business relationship as much for the purpose
of depriving his wife of the alimony and support
money to which she was lawfully entitled, as for
the purpose of bettering his future from a financial point of view. But if the defendant be given
the benefit of all doubts, and his explanation that
he expected eventually to receive profits from
the business which would considerably exceed
what he would earn as wages, he accepted as true,
defendant's legal position w9uld not be improved.
He has neither the right nor the privilege, to
ignore, for a protracted period of time, his legal
o:bligations to his family for the selfish purpose
of advancing his own financial benefit."
Dr. C·allister in Exhibit G, his 1951 State Income
Tax Return (under Schedule B-7), takes a deduction
of $27,525.93 for wages, bonuses and salaries paid. He
then takes (under Schedule B-12) depreciation of
$4,529.60, which depreciation is taken on the clinic at
559 East South Temple (under Schedule H of Exhibit
G). The total of the Doctor's 1951 business expense plus
claimed depreciation for that year is $32·,055.53. In
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1944 the Doctor's gross professional income was
$26,069.08, at which time he was not operating a clinic.
In 1944 the Doctor had a net income from his p.ractice of
$12,686.91 (Tr. 92):
·

In 1951 according to Exhibit G the Doctor had a
gross income of $40,484.57 of which $26,421.46 was from
his practice and $10,800.00 from his hospital a~d
$3,243.11 from dividends ( Tr. 85, 86). In 1951 the Doctor
ends up with a net taxable income of $6,699.64. His
gross professional income in 1951 was $352.38 more
than his gross professional income in 1944, in which
year he had a net income from his practice of $12,686.91.
The Doctor is on the Staff of the L.D.S. Hospital yet
he claims it is neeessary to maintain his own clinic (Tr.
93). At the time of the hearing on the motion to modify
the -clinic was not open ( Tr. 95). The clinic was formed
not. so much to help out the Dnctor financially but as a
help to his patients and upon which he is taking a
financial loss (Tr. 108). The Doctor is a self-styled
idealist and maintains the clinic for the convenience of
himself and to assist his clients (Tr. 109).
The Doctor's claimed loss of income 1s direetly
attributable to the luxury of a clinic that he persists in
maintaining. The record shows that his professional
earnings from personal services . have not decreased
since the entering of the interlocutory decree. On the
other hand the Doctor has capital assets of more than
$110,000.00 which include a new ho1ne valued hy the
witness Solomon at $37,800.00 (Tr. 120). The predicn-
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ment that the Doctor now finds himself in, if it can be
called such, is of his own choosing and this is not suffieient ground for n1odification. The expression of the
Court in Osmus Y. Osm.us, supra, seems peculiarly appropriate.
Dr. Callister has used a tax concept in determining
his income available for payment of his obligation under
the divorce decree. In stating his 1951 net income he
has referred to income after depreciation taken of
$4,529.60 (Exhibit H, Tr. 51-52). In arriving at his
income for 1950 he has further deducted a $2,350.00
capital loss (Tr. 100). Neither of the-se ite-ms affected
the Doctor's cash position, but were bookkeeping entries
only. In Heuchan v. Heuch{JJ'fb, 228 P. 2d 470 (Wash.),
the c·ourt considered an accounting problem identical
with that before us here, and it held that a tax concept
of accounting should not he used in determin!ng ability
to comply with a divorce decree. The Washington Court
used the following language:
"No doubt the Heuchans are entitled to the
claimed deduction of $99.9'6 a month for depTeciation when computing their taxable income, but
we are not limited to their taxable income in
determining appellant's ability to make alimony
payments. It is conceded that this $99.96 is not
paid into any fund for depreciation but is merely
a bookkeeping entry; it is available to and is used
by the Heuchans for their own purposes. The
trial court was fully justified in taking that fact
into consideration when determining the amount
which appellant is able to pay respondent as
·

alim.ony.~'
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The trial court found that the Doctor had been
required to sell many stocks for the purpose of continuing his practice and for providing a home for his family.
As to the necessity for such sales and what effect such
sales should have in this matter, the record speaks for
itself. The Doctor testified that three sales of stocks
were made since 1945. He sold Union Pacific stock for
$10,800.00 in about 1947 (Tr. 62), when he was construct-

ing his new home and his clinic (Tr. 67-68). He sold
various stocks in 1950 for $8,346.70 and paid the proceeds·
on the mortgage on his clinic ( Tr. 66). He sold all of
his Mono-Kearsarge Mining stock for $528.49 in June
1950, and this money was applied on the clinic mortgage

(Tr. 1·16). All three sales of stocks were conversions
into other assets at the Doctor's choosing. No sales were
:. nade after June, 1950 ( Tr. 74).
The trial court found that the Doctor remarried
and now has a minor child four years of age dependent
on him. No other m.oral conclusion can ,be drawn from
the Doctor's letter of March 21, 1945 (Exhibit B) than
that the Doctor contemplated remarriage as soon as possible. ·The letter was before the trial court in 1945 when
~n·ovisions

of the property settlement agreement were
approved with the sure anticipation that in giving hiu1

his freedom the Doctor would acquire a new fa1nily and
new responsibilities.
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III.
THERE IS NO HEALTH CONSIDERATION THAT
MERITS ANY CHANGE.

The letter written by the Doctor to Mrs. C,allister
on March 21, 1945 portrays the Doctor lying in bed
''fighting with this problem and_ having anginal pain,"
and "fervently wishing that ~ final coronary attack
would come and solve the problem" for him. The Doctor
testified that his written exp-ressions we-re interp·retative
of the actual pain that he was suffering, medically speaking, prior to the divorce. The pain was real and not
imaginary and thought by the Doctor to be extremely
significant (Tr. 56, 57). Dr. Viko, testifying for the
defendant, stated that Dr. Callister specializes in surgery and that the witness as the examining physician
did not suggest that his patient retard his work as a
surgeon, nor did he advise him to retire from pTactice
(Tr. 41, 42). The witness' findings would indicate the
same type of heart disease in his present examination
of Dr. Callister as that described by Dr. Callister in
March, 1945 (Tr. 42). Dr. C:allister was advised to
reduce the use of tobacco and to refr~ain from such things
as political campaigns (Tr. 41) and to adhere to a diet
due to over-weight ('Tr. 40). Dr. Callister testified that
he did not think that over the period of the last 7 years
he had lost any of his skill or deteriorated a.t all in his
ability to p·erform services as a surgeon and doctor
in this community (Tr. 97). The claimed physical impairment is dissipated by the record and, in any event,
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the Doctor entered into the contract with his wife with
full knowledge of the heart condition. There is nothing
in the record to show a loss of earnings on account of
any claimed physical condition.

IV.
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME IS THE RESULT OF PRUDENT
MANAGEMENT OF CAPITAL ASSETS RECEIVED AT THE
TIME OF THE DIVORCE.

· · Dr. C'allister, after selling $19,500.00 worth of securities, had dividends in 1951 from the remainder of
$3,243.11. Mrs. Callister's dividend record by way of
her tax returns was excluded by the trial court (Tr.
130, 131) so the only eVidence as to her income other
than the payments from the Doctor is reflected by
Exhibits 1 and 2. By Exhibit 2 Mrs. Callister's net
return from rentals for the year 1951 was $4,255.85 but
against this she is paying $279.84 per month on the
indebtedness against the Nira Apartments. She is also
required to pay income tax on the $4,800.00 paid to her
each year by the ·Doctor. The comparison of income
investment between the Doctor and Mrs. Callister predominates on the side of the D·octor. It is Mrs-. Callister
that could claim, in the absence of the contract, a
change of circumstances calling for an increase in the
payments to her. Mrs. Callister has maintained the
family unit since her husband abandoned her for another
woman. The comparisons that the Doctor now atte1npts
to make are odious. We doubt if this Court will place
a premium upon frugality and co1npetent manage1nent
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of one's own affairs. Mrs. Callister has not realized
upon the claimed enhancement in values of her properties and the assertion by the Doctor in that regard
should be ignored. What Mrs. Callister has by way of
income is the normal consequence of prudent investment
from the capital assets received by her through the
property settlement agreement and the interlocutory
decree of divorce approving the same.

v.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS.

The property settlement agreement was introduced
in evidence as Exhibit A on the modification p,roceedings
(Tr. 55, 56). The last paragraph thereof contains an
express provision for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses
in any manner incurred by plaintiff in the enforcement
of the contract or by reason of any controversy arising
therefrom. This should he sufficient answer to the proposition. The trial court, however, found that Mrs. Callister had sufficient. funds with which to pay her own
attorneys' fees and costs and therefore awarded none.
We submit that even in the absence of a contract Mrs.

c·allister should he entitled to attorneys' fees in resisting
the action of her former husband. To this effect is Stuber
v. Stuber, ______ Utah ...... , 244 P. 2d 650, and the cases
therein cited, and also Lerner v. Superior Court, 242 P.
2d 321 (Cal.).
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CONCLUSION
As was said in Osmus v. Osmu.s, supra, "Courts are
not to be trifled with by litigants." In that case attention
is called to divorce cases, which, although not ordinarily
involving problems of great legal magnitude, quite frequently involve social problems of the utmost delicacy
and importance-problems of such nature that the state,
as well at the litigants, has an interest in their solution.
"A freedom-seeking spouse may not, in his
eagerness to he speedily released from his Inatri, monial bonds, make rash and reckless agreements
and promises, upon which the court 1nay rely in
fixing the amount of alimony, and then return
a few months later and complain that the award
for alimony is excessive or unfair. Such is apparently what was attempted in this case."
Of equal importance is the sanctity of contractthe premise of man's relationship to man under our form
of economy. Property settlements in divorce actions by
way of contract approved by the court should be treated
no .differently than any other contract where the contracting parties have come to an agreement fairly and
without fraud, collusion or overreaching. The monthly
payment to the wife, an integral part of the contract,
should be treated as such no matter what it is called
and should not be confused with the situation involving
necessity or need on the one hand and the ability to pay
on the other-the type of situation ordinarily found in
the absence of contract.
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The rule we are contending for is not without its
logical and reasonable exceptions. As poin'ted out in
the separate concurring opinion in Dickey v. Dickey,
supra, any decree for performance under future as well
as under present conditions is subject to modifica~tion
to adapt it to the future conditions.
"Conditions will change and sometimes render enforcement impracticable; the court will not
insist upon an impractical performance, of course,
but \vill act according to conditions as they ·may
be, and thus, whether we avow it or not, the
decree will be modified or suspended; and it seems
to me this limitation should he recognized in the
rule."
·
But here we have a man who is more than moderately wealthy, with more than the normal earning capacity
·and where his earnings have actually increased rather
than decreased since the time of the divorce. It is not
impractical for him to p·erform nor is there any other
conceivable consideration which, as to him, should cause
the intervention of equity. The words· used in the contract and in the .decree to the effect that Mrs. Callister
will he paid $400.00 p:er month as long as she lives or
until she remarried were carefully expressed, judiciously
weighed and were written in the light of the circumstances and conditions as they then and now exist.
There is no change in the Doctor's circumstances
that warrants a modification even in the absence of the
contract, but we trust that in so holding the Court will
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not avoid settling for this jurisdiction the contractual
and binding nature of a comprehensive and approved
property settlement and alimony agreement.
It is prayed that the judgment appealed from be
reversed and the cause remanded to the lower court to
reinstate the monthly payments in the full sum of $400.00
per month as of January 5, 1953, coupled also with an
order for the lower court to determine the amount of
attorneys' fees that the Doctor should be required to pay
to the plaintiff for the use and benefit of her attorneys in
defending the attack upon the decree both in the trial
court and in this ~c:ourt by reason of the contract and the
proprie'ty of the situation, with an award in the plaintiff's favor for her costs herein incurred. R.espectfully submitted,

JAMES w. BELESS, JR. AND
GUSTIN, RICHARD·S & MATTS·SON
By JAMES W. BELESS, JR.
HARLEY W. GUSTIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
arnd Appellant
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